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Harry Wolk, a private developer, was working with the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on the "Forest Glen Project," a 138-unit low and moderate income housing project situated on
an 11.38 acre woodland tract in Stoughton, Massachusetts. A local
homeowners' group, alleging that HUD had failed to prepare the type
of environmental impact statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),1 sought an injunction to halt the project.
The court determined that the proposed project was likely to be found
a "major federal action" and that the plaintiffs had shown a reasonable
probability of prevailing on the merits. After further finding that the
plaintiffs might suffer irreparable harm, while the defendant would
not, the district court issued an injunction against HUD temporarily
2
halting its participation in the project.
While HUD was preparing an environmental impact statement
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). Section 4332 provides in part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: ...
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
A less researched "Special Environmental Clearance Worksheet" had been filed which
the court found did not comply with the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ)
guidelines. According to the guidelines, every agency must consider NEPA policy and
procedure prior to commencing major undertakings. The NEPA impact statement must
include: (a) a description of the proposed project sufficient for careful assessment;
(b) the probable environmental consequences of the project, both primary and secondary,
including effects on population distribution, land uses, water, public services, etc.; (c)
potential polluting effects of the project; and (d) rigorous exploration through hearings
and objective evaluation of alternative actions that might avoid some or all of the adverse
environmental effects. Inter-agency, federal, state and local, as well as private organizations' opinions and suggestions must be utilized in weighing the short term need against
the long term environmental effects of the project. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7725 (1971). See
generally Kross, Preparationof an Environmental Impact Statement, 44 U. CoLO. L. REV.
81 (1972).
2 Silva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972).
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pursuant to the injunction, Wolk commenced site preparation by
cutting down trees on three acres of the tract. The homeowners' group,
in Silva v. Romney,3 filed a motion for interim relief preserving the
status quo through the imposition of temporary restraints against Wolk.
Relief was denied, ostensibly because the district court "deemed itself
without authority to prevent the developer from doing 'as he wishes'
with his own property." 4 However, the First Circuit remanded, holding
that the private developer's request for, and subsequent HUD approval
of, a $4,000,000 mortgage guarantee and an interest grant of $156,000
brought the federal agency and private developer into a relationship
tantamount to a partnership. Thus, it found that a federal district court
may enjoin private parties under the authority of NEPA. 5 The court
also criticized HUD's lack of regulations designed to preserve the status
quo pending issuance of an impact statement, since this condition compels the judiciary to intervene in situations which might be handled
more efficiently by administrative rule. 6
The major problem faced by the plaintiffs in Silva stems from the
fact that section 102 of NEPA, 7 by its literal wording, refers only to
agencies of the federal government. Thus, although NEPA's specific procedural mandates have been held to create a new legally protected
interest and have consequently broadened the class of persons with
"standing to sue" in environmental causes, 8 plaintiffs have been met
with widely divergent viewpoints in the courts of appeals for the various
3 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
4 Id. at 289.
5 Id. at 292.
6 Id. at 291.
7 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
8 Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), aff'g Sierra Club v. Hickel,
433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), with Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The legally protectible interest given to each American under
NEPA is defined in section 4331 wherein the federal government is made "trustee" to
insure that prior to the inception of a major federal project, each American's right to
enjoy a healthful environment is carefully considered. Broad application of the "standing"
privilege in regard to plaintiffs in an environmental controversy is dealt with in an
extensive footnote in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 465 F.2d 528, 530-31 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Once a legally protected interest is
statutorily created, and the matter in question is not committed solely to agency discretion, then the person whose interest is invaded has "standing" to challenge the agency
action. 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsE §§ 22.01 et seq. (1958). NEPA's mandate
is not discretionary. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 292 (1st Cir. 1973). The legal right to a
healthful environment thus creates the standing in citizens to force the federal government to act affirmatively in fulfilling NEPA procedural mandates. Hanks & Hanks, An
Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERs L. REv. 230, 251 (1970).
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circuits when they have sought to impose NEPA compliance upon nonfederal parties acting in concert with the government.
In City of Boston v. Volpe,9 the First Circuit determined that a
"tentative allocation" of funds to the Massachusetts Port Authority for
runway construction was not sufficient federal involvement to allow an
injunction to issue under NEPA against the Port Authority. The court
devised a "focus" test to determine whether judicial intervention was
warranted as to the non-federal recipient of federal aid. When continuous stages of decisional involvement between federal and private
parties are required, as for highway aid, the "focus" is fixed at the time
that the aid is approved, and the judiciary may intervene at that point.10
However, the City of Boston court found that airport aid was a onetime-only allocation for the whole project, and the "tentative" intraagency allocation was not sufficient federal involvement to allow the
enforcement of NEPA against the non-federal party." The First Circuit
had to distinguish between degrees of "federal involvement" because
four months earlier the district court had allowed an injunction against
a non-federal party in Boston Waterfront Residents Association, Inc.
v. Romney. 12 In that case, HUD had approved and granted over $30,000,000 to the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) for demolition
work along Boston's historic waterfront. The grant had been made in
1965 and, at the commencement of the litigation, one-third of the funds
were still unused. The district court held this to be sufficient "continuing federal involvement" with the project to enforce a temporary injunction against BRA until a NEPA impact statement was prepared by
13
HUD.
The defendant in Silva v. Romney relied primarily on City of
Boston, claiming that
the district court lacks power to enjoin a private party from using
his land as he pleases simply because an application for federal aid
14
has been filed.
Judge Coffin, writing for the circuit court in Silva, distinguished the
preliminary and tentative allocation of federal funds in City of Boston
from the Silva situation in which the developer's request for aid on the
Forest Glen Project had been approved. He held that the firm mortgage
464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
Id. at 259.
11 Id.
12 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972).
13 Id. at 91.
14 473 F.2d at 289.
9

10
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commitment issued by HUD created a contract between the federal
agency and the private developer, who then could be viewed as a
"partner" with HUD. 5 This finding is consistent with the "focus" test
he had created in City of Boston.16 Although he was referring to airport aid in that case, the test is equally applicable to HUD aid requiring
that each "progress payment of the mortgage be approved by the
Commissioner."' 7 Plans, specifications, estimates, construction and conditions of rental were all dictated by HUD during its "continuing
involvement" with the private developer.' 8
A similar problem was faced by the Fourth Circuit in Ely v. Velde.19
That case involved a block grant given by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to the state of Virginia for construction
of a penal facility. Although the court demanded that LEAA comply
with NEPA, it refused to enjoin the state from proceeding with the
project while the statement was being prepared. 20 It held that NEPA
was applicable only to the federal agency, especially in this case where
the monetary grant required no continuing federal involvement.
Despite the apparent unambiguity of Ely's holding, confusion still
exists in the Fourth Circuit due to its earlier decision in West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co. 21 In that case, the
district court had enjoined both private and federal defendants from
proceeding with a project in a national forest until an impact statement
was filed. Only the federal party appealed, so the Fourth Circuit had no
opportunity to deal directly with the propriety of enjoining a private
party.22 If, however, the major thrust of Ely was that no non-federal
party may be enjoined under NEPA, it would seem that the circuit
court could have raised the issue of the propriety of enjoining Island
Creek on its own motion.23 Instead, it ignored the issue.
The Fifth Circuit faced the same question in Named Individual
Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway
Department,24 a case in which highway construction had been approved
prior to the filing of an impact statement concerning the proposed
15 Id.

16 464 F.2d at 258.
17 HUD Reg. B, 24 C.F.R. § 221.541 (1972).
18 HUD Reg. B, 24 C.F.R. §§ 220.501 et seq. (1972).
'9 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
20 Id. at 1139.
21 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971).
22 Id.
23 Lack of federal jurisdiction may be raised by an appellate court on its own motion
at any time. 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE
0.60[4], at 609 (2d ed. 1972).
24 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
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route. The court held this to be a major federal action requiring an
impact statement. By arbitrarily dividing the highway project into
sections, the highway authority had been able to acquire federal aid
without waiting for an impact statement to be filed. It claimed that the
aid would be used on the non-controversial portions, and the controversial section, going through a park, would be built solely with state
funds. Since the court here refused to accept that reasoning, the state
attempted to evade NEPA by renouncing any further use of federal
funds. On the basis of the federal funds already utilized on the project,
the court labeled the entire highway a "system" whose total approval
and compliance with NEPA was essential. 25 Without any discussion of
NEPA's applicability to non-federal agencies, the Highway Authority
was enjoined from further action until the impact statement was filed.
The same result was reached in the Wisconsin case of Scherr v.
Volpe.26 The basis for this litigation was the planned expansion of a
conventional two-lane highway into a four-lane expressway. After finding that NEPA had not been complied with, the court enjoined from
further construction activities the "agents, servants and all other persons
working in concert or cooperation with defendants" until an impact
statement was filed. 27 As in San Antonio, the Scherr court failed to
discuss the threshold question of its jurisdiction to enjoin non-federal
parties.
In addition to those cases in which the courts have either enjoined
or refused to enjoin non-federal parties, there is another group of
cases in which the courts have been able to halt major federal actions
without the necessity of enjoining such parties. These cases typically
are concerned not with federal aid, but with the issuance or denial of
federal permits or approvals. Illustrative of this genre are Calvert Cliffs
CoordinatingCommittee v. AEC 28 and Izaak Walton League of America
v. Schlesinger.29 These cases involved Atomic Energy Commission
25 Id. at 1022, 1023. The Fifth Circuit followed the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), that
Congress is the proper forum to resolve priorities conflicts, not the states which are
recipients of federal funds. Congress has stipulated that parklands and environmental
values are to be considered paramount when juxtaposed with highway needs. Id. at 412.
For a discussion of San Antonio Conservation Society, see Note, To Enforce Federal Environmental Laws, a Federal Court Can Declare a State Highway Project to be "Federal"
and Enjoin the State from Proceeding on its Own, 50 TEx. L. REy. 381 (1972).
26 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
27 Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
28 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
29 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971). The order of the court, which is not officially
reported, appears at 3 E.R.C. 1453, 1456.
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(AEC) operating permits for nuclear powered electrical generating
stations. Another example is Davis v. Morton,80 which challenged the
approval by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of a long-term lease of Indian
lands. In each of these cases, injunctions were issued only against the
federal agencies pending NEPA compliance, but since the federal
actions were the sole element necessary for the projects to proceed, the
private power companies and the private lessee of the Indian lands
were all effectively, albeit not explicitly, enjoined from proceeding.
In the monetary aid cases like Silva, Ely and San Antonio, the
parties stand in a different relationship. In these cases the non-federal
parties might have been able to proceed without the federal funds,
either because their own financial resources would have been sufficient
or because they relied on the ultimate approval of the grant. An injunction against the federal agency may not, as in Silva, effectively deter
the private party from continuing with the project. In order to avoid
complete derogation of NEPA policy, while at the same time observing
their role as courts of limited jurisdiction,u the courts have been
forced to distinguish, either explicitly or implicitly, between the various
relationships of federal agencies and non-governmental parties. The
type of relationship determined to exist has depended upon the amount
of money involved and the degree of supervisory powers to be exercised
by the federal agency within the proposed project. Thus, "continuing
involvement" includes those on-going projects in which federal agency
decisions and allocations to the non-governmental party continue over
a long period of planning and construction. 32 "Tentative allocation"
means that the federal agency has not made certain its commitment to
the non-governmental party.8 3 Lastly, a "block grant" is a no-stringsattached, one-time allocation to a state, city or non-governmental
agency.3 4 In cases of "continuing involvement," private parties have

been enjoined under NEPA, 3n while if the aid is a "tentative allocation"
36
or "block grant," the injunctions have been refused.
80 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
31 Jurisdiction in environmental cases is usually premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(1970), the general "federal question" grant. With respect to private parties not involved
with a federal agency, it is difficult to imagine a "federal question" arising under NEPA.
32 Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Mass.
1971).
83 City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
34 Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
35 Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1971).
36 City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (lst Cir. 1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130
(4th Cir. 1971).

1973]

NO TES

The arbitrary and capricious results of drawing such fine lines of
distinction led the Silva court to confess to
a sense of growing uneasiness seeing decisions determining the
obligations of federal and non-federal parties under NEPA turn on
any one interim step in the development of the partnership between the parties. Such an approach unrealistically stresses advantageous factors which bear little relationship to either the broad
concerns of NEPA or the interests of the potential grantee, private
87
or public.
The remainder of this note will be concerned with possible
criteria by which courts may more openly assess governmental/private
party relationships. The Silva court summarily decided that a "partnership" contract arose between HUD and Wolk when HUD made
a financing commitment to him 8 8 The weakness of this decision stems

from the use of the word "partnership" in such a colloquial manner
and without adequate analysis. It is apparent from the contractual
agreement between HUD and Wolk that they did not agree to share
profits and losses, nor did they agree to continue the relationship beyond this one project; in short, they neither agreed nor intended to
become partners. The type of business association which this HUD/
developer relationship most closely resembles is the joint venture.8 9
In general, a joint venture is founded upon contract, and the mutual
rights and liabilities of the venturers stem from that contract. 40 However, the rights and liabilities of the venturers vis-4-vis third parties
stem not from the contractual intent of the venturers, but from the
"legal intent" inferred from their actions. 41 That is, parties who are
not legally joint venturers may, because of their representations to
third parties, either be held to the liability of joint venturers, 42 or be
estopped to deny that such a relationship exists between them. 43 Thus,
parties who are not joint venturers with respect to each other may,
37 473 F.2d at 290.
38 Id.

39 This conclusion is based upon the fact that joint ventures, unlike partnerships,
are formed for one particular purpose only and do not involve a continuing relationship.
In addition, in a joint venture the parties need not agree to share losses. See Roegge,
Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments and the Institutional Lender: Nothing
Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FoRHAm L. REv. 579, 590-91 (1971); Dorsey, Rights and
Obligations of Joint Venturers as Principals Under the Standard Form of Surety Bonds,
1971 ABA SEcr. INs. NEG. & COMP. LAW 144-45.
40 Dorsey, supra note 39.
41 Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 39, at 594.
42 Albina Engine & Mach. Works, Inc. v. Abel, 305 F.2d 77, 82 (10th Cir. 1962).
43 Rivett v. Nelson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 168, 173, 322 P.2d 515, 520 (1958).
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depending upon the nature of their representations and the reliance
which they have induced, be held jointly bound for certain purposes,
for example, environmental enforcement, and not bound for others,
such as tort and contract liability.
The Silva case presents a good example of the type of fact situation
to which these general principles are applicable. The offer to complete
the "Forest Glen Project" was made by Wolk when he submitted a
"firm commitment" to HUD, which included a combined application
and commitment fee of $3.00 per $1,000 of the amount of the mortgage
for which he applied. 44 The commitment issued by HUD constituted
an acceptance of the offer and thus created the contract. 45 To have
reached this stage, Wolk must have submitted plans and specifications
commensurate with HUD guidelines as to the number of units, costs
per unit, maximum rental to be charged per unit, as well as numerous
other required specifications.4 8 The federal/private party "community

of interest" rested on these inextricably commingled contributions to
the project's development. Wolk, as private developer, entered the
relationship with the expectation of making a profit, while HUD's
consideration would be an increased housing supply. In effect, Wolk
promised to contribute his construction skill and expertise as well as
his land in exchange for the federal mortgage guarantee and interest
grant. 4 7 In addition, Wolk had to agree that

[t]he property, including improvements, shall comply with any
material zoning or deed restrictions applicable to the project
site and with all applicable building and other governmental
regulations.48

The existence of such HUD contracts are made known in the
local communities through both the familiar signs at the project site
and through the representations which the builders must make to the
local governments for site plan approvals, etc. Thus, the concerned
citizen who is aware of the federal government's protective policy
toward the environment has a right to expect that a project under the
federal aegis will comport with at least minimal environmental standards. At least as to the protection of this limited environmental interest, the agency and developer are joint venturers. If these legitimate
expectations are not fulfilled and the public reliance proves ill-founded
HUD Reg. B, 24 C.F.R. § 221.504 (1972).
473 F.2d at 289; HUD Reg. B, 24 C.F.R. § 221.509 (1972).
46 See HUD Reg. B, 24 C.F.R. §§ 236 et seq. (1972).
47 Cf. Saxon v. Howey, 247 Mich. 508, 226 N.W. 228 (1929).
48 HUD Reg. B, 24 C.F.R. § 221.545(c) (1972) (emphasis added).
44
45
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because the federal agency has abrogated its statutory responsibilities,
then an injunction should issue against the joint venture itself. Thus,
Wolk, having dedicated certain property to the joint venture, and
having induced public reliance, should, as an agent of the Forest Glen
venture, be prohibited from utilizing the property to his own benefit.
This is true notwithstanding the fact that he has legal title to the
49
property and is using his own funds to commence work on it.
The exact moment at which the federal agency/private party relationship becomes a joint venture for environmental purposes is admittedly a difficult determination for the courts. However, it is common knowledge that the enormous monetary outlay required in the
construction of low income residential complexes is rarely at the command of an individual. Although private parties may have the resources
to do initial preparatory work, courts should take notice of the reliance
which such parties place upon future appropriations from the federal
government for the completion of the projects. Considering the plethora of governmental regulations to which the mortgagor must submit
when entering this undertaking, it is not unreasonable for the court to
also impose NEPA standards on the venture itself and, through the
venture, upon the private party, since "it is beyond challenge that one in
partnership with the federal government can be prohibited from acting
50
in a certain manner."
In conclusion, private developers who have voluntarily sought
federal aid and have induced public reliance upon federal supervision
of environmental standards should not be permitted to evade federal
regulations such as NEPA. This is especially true in a case such as this,
involving the cutting of trees, where lack of early compliance is tantamount to the Act's abrogation. NEPA is not designed to permanently
halt projects, but to make agencies and their private partners consider
environmental factors along with all others before beginning construction.51 Until all governmental agencies incorporate within their regulations some means of forcing NEPA compliance upon the private
parties who request their aid, the courts must look to the common law
principles of third party reliance upon representations in order to
find that the parties are joint venturers for environmental purposes,
and to thereby carry out the congressional mandate.
Isabel Brawer Stark
49 See Dorsey, supra note 39, at 150.

50 Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958).
51 Statement by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Hearing on S.1075, S. 237, S. 1752 Before
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1969).

